


















A Characterization of Ideal Weighted Secret Sharing Schemes
Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko
Abstract. Beimel, Tassa and Weinreb (2008) and Farras and Padro (2010) partially
characterized access structures of ideal weighted threshold secret sharing schemes
in terms of the operation of composition. They classified indecomposable ideal
weighted threshold access structures, and proved that any other ideal weighted
threshold access structure is a composition of indecomposable ones. It remained
unclear which compositions of indecomposable weighted threshold access structures
are weighted. In this paper we fill the gap. Using game-theoretic techniques we de-
termine which compositions of indecomposable ideal access structures are weighted,
and obtain an if and only if characterization of ideal weighted threshold secret shar-
ing schemes.
1 Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are modifications of cooperative games to the situation when not money
but information is shared. Instead of dividing a certain sum of money between participants a se-
cret sharing scheme divides a secret into shares—which is then distributed among participants—
so that some coalitions of participants have enough information to recover the secret (authorised
coalitions) and some (nonauthorised coalitions) do not. A scheme is perfect if it gives no in-
formation to nonauthorised coalitions whatsoever. A perfect scheme is most informationally
efficient if the shares contain the same number of bits as the secret (Karnin, Greene, & Hellman,
1983); such schemes are called ideal. The set of authorised coalitions is said to be the access
structure.
However, not all access structures can can carry an ideal secret sharing scheme (Stinson,
1992). Finding a description of those which can carry appeared to be quite difficult. A major
milestone in this direction was the paper by (Brickell & Davenport, 1991) who showed that all
ideal secret sharing schemes can be obtained from matroids. Not all matroids, however, define
ideal schemes (Seymour, 1992) so the problem is reduced to classifying those matroids that do.
There was little further progress, if any, in this direction.
Several authors attempted to classify all ideal access structures in subclasses of secret shar-
ing schemes. These include access structures defined by graphs (Brickell & Davenport, 1991),
weighted threshold access structures (Beimel, Tassa, & Weinreb, 2008; Farra`s & Padro´, 2010),
hierarchical access structures (Farra`s & Padro´, 2010), bipartite and tripartite access structures
(Padro´ & Sa´ez, 1998; Padro´ & Sa´ez, 2004; Farra`s, Mart´ı-Farre´, & Padro´, 2012). While in the
classes of bipartite and tripartite access structures the ideal ones were given explicitly, for the
case of weighted threshold access structures (Beimel et al., 2008) suggested a new kind of de-
scription. This method uses the operation of composition of access structures (Martin, 1993).
The idea is that sometimes all players can be classified into ’strong’ players and ’weak’ players
and the access structure can be decomposed into the main game that contains strong players
and the auxiliary game which contains weak players. Under this approach the first task is ob-
taining a characterisation of indecomposable structures. Beimel et al. (2008) proved that every
ideal indecomposable secret sharing scheme is either disjunctive hierarchical or tripartite. Farra`s
and Padro´ (2010); Farra`s and Padro´ (2012) later gave a more precise classification which was
complete (but some access structures that they viewed as indecomposable later appeared to be
decomposable).
If a composition of two weighted access structures were again a weighted structure there
will not be need to do anything else. However, we will show that this is not true. Since the
composition of two weighted access structures may not be again weighted, it is not clear which
indecomposable structures and in which numbers can be combined to obtain more complex
weighted access structures. To answer this question in this paper we undertake a thorough
investigation of the operation of composition.
Since the access structure of any secret sharing scheme is a simple game in the sense of
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), we found it more convenient to use game-theoretic methods
and terminology.
Section 2 of the paper gives the background in simple games. We introduce some important
concepts from game theory like Isbel’s desirability relation on players, which will play in this
paper an important role. We remind the reader of the concept of complete simple game which
is a simple game for which Isbel’s desirability relation is complete1. We introduce the technique
of trading transforms and certificates of nonweightedness (Gvozdeva & Slinko, 2011) for proving
that a simple game is a weighted threshold games.
In Section 3, we give the motivation for the concept of composition C = G ◦g H of two
games G and H over an element g ∈ G, give the definition and examples. The essence of this
construction is as follows: in the first game G we choose an element g ∈ G and replace it with
the second game H. The winning coalitions in the new game are of two types. Firstly, every
winning coalition in G that does not contain g remains winning in C. A winning coalition in
G which contained g needs a winning coalition of H to be added to it to become winning in
C. We prove several properties of this operation, in particular, we prove that the operation of
1In (Farra`s & Padro´, 2010) such games are called hierarchical.
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composition of games is associative.
Section 4 presents preliminary results regarding the compositions of ideal games and weighted
games in general. We start with reminding the reader that the composition of two games is ideal
if and only if the two games being composed are ideal (Beimel et al., 2008). Then we show that
if a weighted game is composed of two games, then the two composed games are also weighted.
Finally, we prove the first sufficient condition for a composition to be weighted.
Section 5 is devoted to compositions in the class of complete games. We prove that, with
few possible exceptions, the composition of two complete games is complete if and only if the
composition is over the weakest player relative to the desirability relation of the first game.
We show that the composition of two weighted threshold simple games may not be weighted
threshold even if we compose over the weakest player. We give some sufficient conditions for the
composition of two weighted games to be weighted.
In Section 6 we prove that onepartite games are indecomposable, and also prove the unique-
ness of some decompositions.
In Section 7 we recap the classification of indecomposable ideal weighted simple games given
by Farra`s and Padro´ (2010). According to it all ideal indecomposable games are either k-out-
of-n games or belong to one of the six classes: B1, B2, B3, T1, T2, T3. We show that some
of the games in their list are in fact decomposable, and hence arrive at a refined list of all
indecomposable ideal weighted simple games.
In Section 8 we investigate which of the games from the refined list can be composed to
obtain a new ideal weighted simple game. The result is quite striking; the composition of
two indecomposable weighted games is weighted only in two cases: when the first game is a
k-out-of-n game, or if the first game is of type B2 (from the Farras and Padro list) and the
second game is an anti-unanimity game where all players are passers i.e., players that can win
without forming a coalition with other players. This has a major implication for the refinement
of Beimel-Tassa-Weinreb-Farras-Padro theorem.
In Section 9, using the results of Section 8, we show that a game G is an ideal weighted
simple game if and only if it is a composition
G = H1 ◦ · · · ◦Hs ◦ I ◦ An,
where Hi is a ki-out-of-ni game for each i = 1, 2, . . . , s, An is an anti-unanimity game, and I is
an indecomposable game of types B1, B2, B3, T1, and T3. Any of these may be absent but An
may appear only if I is of type B2. The main surprise in this result is that in the decomposition




The main motivation for this work comes from secret sharing. However, the access structure on
the set of users is a simple game on that set so we will use game-theoretic terminology.
Definition 1 (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). A simple game is a pair G = (PG,WG),
where PG is a set of players and WG ⊆ 2
PG is a nonempty set of coalitions which satisfies the
monotonicity condition:
if X ∈WG and X ⊆ Y , then Y ∈WG.
Coalitions from set WG are called winning coalitions of G, the remaining ones are called losing.
A typical example of a simple game is the United Nations Security Council, which consists
of five permanent members and 10 nonpermanent. The passage of a resolution requires that
all five permanent members vote for it, and also at least nine members in total. The book by
Taylor and Zwicker (1999) gives many other interesting examples.
A simple game will be called just a game. The set WG of winning coalitions of a game G
is completely determined by the set WminG of its minimal winning coalitions. A player which
does not belong to any minimal winning coalitions is called a dummy. He can be removed from
any winning coalition without making it losing. A player who is contained in every minimal
winning coalition is called a vetoer. A game with a unique minimal winning coalition is called
an oligarchy. In an oligarchy every player is either a vetoer or a dummy. A player who alone
forms a winning coalition is called a passer. A game in which all minimal winning coalitions
are singletons is called anti-oligarchy. In an anti-oligarchy every player is either a passer or a
dummy.
Definition 2. A simple game G is called weighted threshold game if there exist nonnegative




wi ≥ q. (1)
This game is denoted [q;w1, . . . , wn]. We call such a game simply weighted.
It is easy to see that the United Nation Security Council can be defined in terms of weights
as [39; 7, . . . , 7, 1, . . . , 1]. In secret sharing weighted threshold access structures were introduced
by (Shamir, 1979; Blakley, 1979).
For X ⊂ P we will denote its complement P \X by Xc.
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Definition 3. Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and A ⊆ P . Let us define subsets
Wsg = {X ⊆ A
c | X ∈W}, Wrg = {X ⊆ A
c | X ∪A ∈W}.
Then the game GA = (A
c,Wsg) is called a subgame of G and G
A = (Ac,Wrg) is called a reduced
game of G.
The two main concepts of the theory of games that we will need here are as follows.
Given a simple game G on the set of players P we define a relation G on P by setting
i G j if for every set X ⊆ P not containing i and j
X ∪ {j} ∈WG =⇒ X ∪ {i} ∈WG. (2)
In such case we will say that i is at least as desirable (as a coalition partner) as j. In the
United Nations Security Council every permanent member will be more desirable than any
nonpermanent one. This relation is reflexive and transitive but not always complete (total)
(e.g., see Carreras and Freixas (1996)). The corresponding equivalence relation on [n] will be
denoted ∼G and the strict desirability relation as ≻G. If this can cause no confusion we will
omit the subscript G.
Definition 4. Any game with complete desirability relation is called complete.
Example 1. Any weighted game is complete.
We note that in (2) we can choose X which is minimal with this property in which case
X ∪ {i} will be a minimal winning coalition. Hence the following is true.
Proposition 1. Given a simple game G on the set of players P and two players i.j ∈ P , the
relation i ≻G j is equivalent to the existence of a minimal winning coalition X which contains i
but not j such that (X \ {i}) ∪ {j} is losing.
We recap that a sequence of coalitions
T = (X1, . . . ,Xj ;Y1, . . . , Yj) (3)
is a trading transform (Taylor & Zwicker, 1999) if the coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj can be converted
into the coalitions Y1, . . . , Yj by rearranging players. This latter condition can also be expressed
as
|{i : a ∈ Xi}| = |{i : a ∈ Yi}| for all a ∈ P .
It is worthwhile to note that while in (3) we can consider that no Xi coincides with any of Yk, it
is perfectly possible that the sequence X1, . . . ,Xj has some terms equal, the sequence Y1, . . . , Yj
can also contain equal terms.
Elgot (1960) proved (see also Taylor and Zwicker (1999)) the following fundamental fact.
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Theorem 1. A game G is a weighted threshold game if for no integer j there exists a trading
transform (3) such that all coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj are winning and all Y1, . . . , Yj are losing.
Due to this theorem any trading transform (3) where all coalitions X1, . . . ,Xj are winning
and all Y1, . . . , Yj are losing is called a certificate of nonweightedness (Gvozdeva & Slinko, 2011).
Completeness can also be characterized in terms of trading transforms (Taylor & Zwicker,
1999).
Theorem 2. A game G is complete if no certificate of nonweightedness exists of the form
T = (X ∪ {x}, Y ∪ {y};X ∪ {y}, Y ∪ {x}). (4)
We call (4) a certificate of incompleteness. This theorem says that completeness is equivalent
to the impossibility for two winning coalitions to swap two players and become both losing. This
latter property is also called swap robustness.
A complete game G = (P,W ) can be compactly represented using multisets. All its players
are split into equivalence classes of players of equal desirability. If, say, we have m equivalence
classes, i.e., P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm with |Pi| = ni, then we can think that P is the multiset
{1n1 , 2n2 , . . . ,mnm}.
A submultiset {1ℓ1 , 2ℓ2 , . . . ,mℓm} will then denote the class of coalitions where ℓi players come
from Pi, i = 1, . . . ,m. All of them are either winning or all losing. We may enumerate classes
so that 1 ≻G 2 ≻G · · · ≻G m. The game with m classes is called m-partite.
If a game G is complete, then we define shift-minimal (Carreras & Freixas, 1996) winning
coalitions as follows. By a shift we mean a replacement of a player of a coalition by a less
desirable player which did not belong to it. Formally, given a coalition X, player p ∈ X and
another player q /∈ X such that q ≺G p, we say that the coalition (X \ {p}) ∪ {q} is obtained
from X by a shift. A winning coalition X is shift-minimal if every coalition strictly contained
in it and every coalition obtained from it by a shift are losing. A complete game is fully defined
by its shift-minimal winning coalitions.
Example 2 (Onepartite games). Let Hn,k be the game where there are n players and it takes k
or more to win. Such games are called k-out-of-n games. Alternatively they can be characterised
as the class of complete 1-partite games, i.e., the games with a single class of equivalent players.
The game Hn,n is special and is called the unanimity game on n players. We will denote it as
Un. The game Hn,1 does not have a name in the literature. We will call it anti-unanimity game
and denote An.
Example 3 (Bipartite games). Here we introduce two important types of bipartite games. A
hierarchical disjunctive game H∃(n,k) with n = (n1, n2) and k = (k1, k2) on a multiset P =
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{1n1 , 2n2} is defined by the set of winning coalitions
W∃ = {{1
ℓ1 , 2ℓ2} | (ℓ1 ≥ k1) ∨ (ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2)},
where 1 ≤ k1 < k2, k1 ≤ n1 and k2 − k1 < n2. A hierarchical conjunctive game H∀(n,k) with
n = (n1, n2) and k = (k1, k2) on a multiset P = {1
n1 , 2n2} is defined by the set of winning
coalitions
W∀ = {{1
ℓ1 , 2ℓ2} | (ℓ1 ≥ k1) ∧ (ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2)},
where 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2, k1 ≤ n1 and k2 − k1 < n2. In both cases, if the restrictions on n and k are
not satisfied the game becomes 1-partite (Gvozdeva, Hameed, & Slinko, 2013)).
Example 4 (Tripartite games). Here we introduce two types of tripartite games. Let n =
(n1, n2, n3) and k = (k1, k2, k3), where n1, n2, n3 and k1, k2, k3 are positive integers. The game
∆1(n,k) is defined on the multiset P = {1
n1 , 2n2 , 3n3} with the set of winning coalitions
{{1ℓ1 , 2ℓ2 , 3ℓ3} | (ℓ1 ≥ k1) ∨ [(ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2) ∧ (ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 ≥ k3)},
where
k1 < k3, k2 < k3, n1 ≥ k1, n2 > k2 − k1 and n3 > k3 − k2. (5)
These, in particular, imply n1 + n2 ≥ k2.
The game ∆2(n,k) is for the case when n2 ≤ k2 − k1, and it is defined on the multiset
P = {1n1 , 2n2 , 3n3} with the set of winning coalitions
{{1ℓ1 , 2ℓ2 , 3ℓ3} | (ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2) ∨ [(ℓ1 ≥ k1) ∧ (ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 ≥ k3)}.
where
k1 < k2 < k3, n1 + n2 ≥ k2, n3 > k3 − k2, and n2 + n3 > k3 − k1. (6)
These conditions, in particular, imply n1 ≥ k1 and n3 ≥ 2.
In both cases, if the restrictions on n and k are not satisfied the game either contains dummies
or becomes 2-partite or even 1-partite (see a justification of this claim in the appendix).
The games in these three examples play a crucial role in classification of ideal weighted secret
sharing schemes (Beimel et al., 2008; Farra`s & Padro´, 2010).
3 The Operation of Composition of Games
The most general type of compositions of simple games was defined by Shapley (1962). We need
a very partial case of that concept here, which is in the context of secret sharing, was introduced
by Martin (1993).
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Definition 5. Let G and H be two games defined on disjoint sets of players and g ∈ PG. We
define the composition game C = G ◦g H by defining PC = (PG \ {g}) ∪ PH and
WC = {X ⊆ PC | XG ∈WG or XG ∪ {g} ∈WG and XH ∈WH},
where XG = X ∩ PG and XH = X ∩ PH .
This is a substitution of the game H instead of a single element g of the first game. All
winning compositions in G not containing g remain winning in C. If a winning coalition of G
contained g, then it remains winning in C if g is replaced with a winning coalition of H. One
might imagine that, if a certain issue is voted in G, then voters of H are voted first and then
their vote is counted in the first game as if it was a vote of player g. Such situation appears, for
example, if a very experienced expert resigns from a company, they might wish to replace him
with a group of experts.
Definition 6. A game G is said to be indecomposable if there does not exist two games H
and K and h ∈ PH such that min(|H|, |K|) > 1 and G ∼= H ◦h K. Alternatively, it is called
decomposable.
Example 5. Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and A ⊆ P be the set of all vetoers in this game.
Let |A| = m. Then G ∼= Um+1 ◦uGA, where u is any player of Um+1. So any game with vetoers
is decomposable.
Example 6. Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and A ⊆ P be the set of all passers in this game.
Let |A| = m. Then G ∼= Am+1 ◦aGA, where a is any player of Am+1. So any game with passers
is decomposable.
Suppose G = (P,W ) and G′ = (P ′,W ′) be two games and σ : P → P ′ is a bijection. We
say that σ is an isomorphism of G and G′, and denote this as G ∼= G′, if X ∈ W if and only if
σ(X) ∈W ′.
It is easy to see that if |H| = 1, then H ◦h K ∼= K and, if |K| = 1, then H ◦h K ∼= H.
Proposition 2. Let G,H be two games defined on the disjoint set of players and g ∈ PG. Then
WminG◦gH = {X | X ∈W
min
G and g /∈ X}∪{X ∪Y | X ∪ {g} ∈W
min
G and Y ∈W
min
H with g /∈ X}.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition.
Proposition 3. Let G,H,K be three games defined on the disjoint set of players and g ∈ PG,
h ∈ PH . Then
(G ◦g H) ◦h K ∼= G ◦g (H ◦h K),
that is the two compositions are isomorphic.
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Proof. Let us classify the minimal winning coalitions of the game (G◦gH)◦hK. By Proposition 2
they can be of the following types:
• X ∈WminG with g /∈ X;
• X ∪ Y , where X ∪ {g} ∈WminG and Y ∈W
min
H with g /∈ X and h /∈ Y ;
• X ∪Y ∪Z, where X ∪{g} ∈WminG , Y ∪{h} ∈W
min
H and Z ∈W
min
K with g /∈ X and h /∈ Y .
It is easy to see that the game G◦g (H◦hK) has exactly the same minimal winning coalitions.
Proposition 4. Let G,H be two games defined on the disjoint set of players. Then G ◦gH has
no dummies if and only if both G and H have no dummies.
Proof. Straightforward.
4 Decompositions of Weighted Games and Ideal Games
The following result was proved in (Beimel et al., 2008) and was a basis for this new type of
description.
Proposition 5. Let C = G◦gH be a decomposition of a game C into two games G and H over
an element g ∈ PG, which is not dummy. Then, C is ideal if and only if G and H are also ideal.
Suppose we have a class of games C such that if the composition G ◦g H belongs to C, then
both G and H belong to C. This proposition means that in any class of games C with the
above property we may represent any game as a composition of indecomposable ideal games
also belonging to C. The class of weighted games as the following lemma shows satisfies the
above property, Hence, if we would like to describe ideal games in the class of weighted games
we should look at indecomposable weighted games first.
Lemma 1. Let C = G ◦g H be a decomposition of a game C into two games G and H over an
element g ∈ PG, which is not dummy. Then, if C is weighted, then G and H are weighted.
Proof. Suppose first that C is weighted but H is not. Then we have a certificate of nonweight-
edness (U1, . . . , Uj ;V1, . . . , Vj) for the game H. Let also X be any minimal winning coalition of
G containing g (since g is not a dummy, it exists). Let X ′ = X \ {g}. Then
(X ′ ∪ U1, . . . ,X
′ ∪ Uj ;X
′ ∪ V1, . . . ,X
′ ∪ Vj)
is a certificate of nonweightedness for C. Suppose now that C is weighted but G is not. Then
let (X1, . . . ,Xj ;Y1, . . . , Yj) be a certificate of nonweightedness for G and W be a fixed minimal




Xi \ {g} ∪W if g ∈ Xi






Yi \ {g} ∪W if g ∈ Yi
Yi if g /∈ Yi
Then, since |{i | g ∈ Xi}| = |{i | g ∈ Yi}|, the following




1 , . . . , Y
′
j )
is a trading transform in C. Moreover, it is a certificate of nonweightedness for C since all
X ′1, . . . ,X
′
j ; are winning in C and all Y
′
1 , . . . , Y
′
j are losing in C. So both assumptions are
impossible.
Corollary 1. Every weighted game is a composition of indecomposable weighted games.2
The converse is however not true. As we will see in the next section, the composition
C = G ◦g H of two weighted games G and H is seldom weighted. Thus we will pay attention to
those cases where compositions are weighted. One of those which we will now consider is when
G is a k-out-of-n game. In this case all players of G are equivalent and we will often omit g and
write the composition as C = G ◦H.
Theorem 3. Let H = Hn,k be a k-out-of-n game and G is a weighted simple game. Then
C = H ◦G is also a weighted game.
Proof. Let X1, . . . ,Xm be winning and Y1, . . . , Ym be losing coalitions of C such that
(X1, . . . ,Xm;Y1, . . . , Ym)
is a trading transform. Without loss of generality we may assume that X1, . . . ,Xm are minimal
winning coalitions. Let Ui = Xi ∩H, then Ui is either winning in H or winning with h, hence
|Ui| = k or |Ui| = k−1. If for a single i we had |Ui| = k, then all of the sets Y1, . . . , Ym could not
be losing since at least one of them would contain k elements from H. Thus |Ui| = k−1 for all i.
In this case we have Xi = Ui ∪Si, where Si is winning in G. Let Yi = Vi∪Ti, where Vi ⊆ H and
Ti ⊆ G. Since all coalitions Y1, . . . , Ym are losing in C, we get |Vi| = k− 1 which implies that all
Ti are losing in G. But now we have obtained a trading transform (S1, . . . , Sm;T1, . . . , Tm) in G
such that all Si are winning and all Ti are losing. This contradicts to G being weighted.
5 Compositions of complete games
We will start with the following observation. It says that if g ∈ PG is not the least desirable
player of G, then the composition G ◦g H is almost never swap robust, hence is almost never
complete.
2As usual we assume that if a game G is indecomposable, its decomposition into a composition of indecom-
posable games is G = G, i.e., trivial.
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Lemma 2. Let G,H be two games on disjoint sets of players and H is neither a unanimity nor
an anti-unanimity. If for two elements g, g′ ∈ PG we have g ≻ g
′ and g′ is not a dummy, then
G ◦g H is not complete.
Proof. As g is more desirable than g′, there exists a coalition X ⊆ PG, containing neither g
nor g′ such that X ∪ {g} ∈ WG and X ∪ {g
′} /∈ WG. We may take X to be minimal with this
property, then X ∪{g} is a minimal winning coalition of G. Since g′ is not dummy, there exist a
minimal winning coalition Y containing g′. The coalition Y may contain g or may not. Firstly,
assume that it does contain g. Since H is not an oligarchy there exist two distinct winning
coalitions of H, say Z1 and Z2. Then we can find z ∈ Z1 \Z2. Then the coalitions U1 = X ∪Z1
and U2 = (Y \ {g}) ∪ Z2 are winning in G ◦g H and coalitions V1 = (X ∪ {g
′}) ∪ (Z1 \ {z})
and V2 = Y \ {g, g
′} ∪ (Z2 ∪ {z}) are losing in this game since Z1 \ {z} is losing in H and
Y \ {g′} = Y \ {g, g′} ∪ {g} is losing in G. Since V1 and V2 are obtained when U1 and U2 swap
players z and g′, the sequence of sets (U1, U2;V1, V2) is a certificate of incompleteness for G◦gH.
Suppose now Y does not contain g. Let Z be any minimal winning coalition of H that has
more than one player (it exists since H is not an anti-oligarchy). Let z ∈ Z. Then
(X ∪ Z, Y ;X ∪ {g′} ∪ (Z \ {z}), Y \ {g′} ∪ {z})
is a certificate of incompleteness for G ◦g H.
This lemma shows that if a composition G ◦g H of two weighted games is weighted, then
almost always g is one of the least desirable players of G. The converse as we will see in Section 7
is not true. If we compose two weighted games over the weakest player of the first game, the
result will be always complete but not always weighted.
Theorem 4. Let G and H be two complete games, g ∈ G be one of the least desirable players
in G but not a dummy. Then for the game C = G ◦g H
(i) for x, y ∈ PG \ {g} it holds that x G y if and only if x C y. Moreover, x ≻G y if and
only if x ≻C y;
(ii) for x, y ∈ PH it holds that x H y if and only if x C y. Moreover, x ≻H y if and only if
x ≻C y;
(iii) for x ∈ PG \ {g} and y ∈ PH , then x C y; if y is not a passer or vetoer in H, then
x ≻C y.
In particular, C is complete.
Proof. (i) Suppose x G y but not x C y. Then there exist Z ⊆ C such that Z ∪ {y} ∈ WC
but Z ∪ {x} /∈ WC . We can take Z minimal with this property. Consider Z
′ = Z ∩ PG. Then
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either Z ′ ∪ {y} is winning in G, or else Z ′ ∪ {y} is losing in G but Z ′ ∪ {y} ∪ {g} is winning in
G. In the latter case Z ∩PH ∈WH . In the first case, since x G y, we have also Z
′∪{x} ∈WG,
which contradicts Z ∪ {x} /∈ WC . Similarly, in the second case we have Z
′ ∪ {x} ∪ {g} ∈ WG
and since Z ∩ PH ∈WH , this contradicts Z ∪ {x} /∈WC also. Hence x C y.
If x ≻G y, then there exists S ⊆ PG such that S ∩ {x, y} = ∅ and S ∪ {x} ∈ WG but
S ∪{x} /∈WG. We may assume S is minimal with this property. If S does not contain g, then S
is also winning in C and x ≻C y, so we are done. (ii) This case is similar to the previous one. If
S contains g, then consider any winning coalition K in H. Then (S \ {g})∪ {x} ∪K is winning
in C whille (S \ {g}) ∪ {y} ∪K is losing in C. Hence x ≻C y.
(iii) We have x G g since g is from the least desirable class in G. Let us consider a coalition
Z ⊂ C such that Z ∩ {x, y} = ∅, and suppose there exists Z ∪ {y} ∈ WC but Z ∪ {x} /∈ WC .
Then Z must be losing in C, and hence Z ∩PG cannot be winning in G, but Z ∩PG ∪{g} must
be winning in G. However, since x G g, the coalition Z ∩ PG ∪ {x} is also winning in G. But
then Z ∪ {x} is winning in C, a contradiction. This shows that if Z ∪ {y} is winning in C, then
Z ∪ {x} is also winning in C, meaning x C y. Thus C is a complete game.
Moreover, suppose that y is not a passer or a vetoer in H, we will show that x ≻C y. Since
g is not a dummy, then x is not a dummy either. Let X be a minimal winning coalition of G
containing x. If g /∈ X, then X is also winning in C. However, X \{x}∪{y} is losing in C, since
y is not a passer in H. Thus it is not true that y C x in this case. If g ∈ X, then consider a
winning coalition Y in H not containing y (this is possible since y is not a vetoer in H). Then
X \ {g} ∪ Y ∈WC but
X \ {x} ∪ {g} ∪ {y} ∪ Y /∈WC ,
whence it is not true that y C x in this case as well. Thus x ≻C y in case y is neither a passer
nor a vetoer in H.
6 Indecomposable onepartite games and uniqueness of some de-
compositions
Theorem 5. A game Hn,k for n 6= k 6= 1 is indecomposable.
Proof. Suppose Hn,k is decomposable into Hn,k = K ◦g L, where K = (PK ,WK), L = (PL,WL)
with n1 = |PK | ≥ 2 and n2 = |PL| ≥ 2. If g is a passer in K, then it is the only passer, otherwise
if there is another passer g′ in K, then {g′} is winning in the composition, contradicting k 6= 1.
We will firstly show that n2 < k. Suppose that n2 ≥ k, and choose a player h ∈ PK
different from g. Consider a coalition X containing k players from PL, then X is winning in the
composition and g is a passer, and it is also true that X is a minimal winning coalition in L.
Now replace a player x in X from PL with h. The resulting coalition, although it has k players,
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is losing in the composition, because x is not a passer in K, and k−1 players from PL are losing
in L. Therefore k > n2.
We also have |PK \ {g}| = n − n2 > k − n2 > 0. Let us choose any coalition Z in PK \ {g}
with k − n2 players. Note that it does not win with g as |Z ∪ {g}| = k − n2 + 1 < k players.
This is why Z ∪ PL is also losing despite having k players in total, contradiction.
If the first component of the composition is a k-out-of-n game, there is a uniqueness of
decomposition.
Theorem 6. Let Hn1,k1 and Hn2,k2 be two k-out-of-n games which are not unanimity games.
Then, if G = Hn1,k1 ◦ G1 = Hn2,k2 ◦ G2, with G1 and G2 having no passers, then n1 = n2,
k1 = k2 and G1 = G2. If G = Un1 ◦G1 = Un2 ◦G2 and G1 and G2 does not have vetoers, then
n1 = n2 and G1 = G2.
Proof. Suppose that we know that G = H ◦ G1, where H is a k-out-of-n game but not a
unanimity game. Then all winning coalitions in G of smallest cardinality have k players, so k
in this case can be recovered unambiguously.
If G1 does not have passers, then n can be also recovered since the set of all players that
participate in winning coalitions of size k will have cardinality n− 1. So there cannot exist two
decompositions G = Hn1,k1 ◦ G1 and G = Hn2,k2 ◦ G2 of G, where k1 6= k2 with k1 6= n1 and
k2 6= n2.
Let us consider now the game G = U ◦G1, where U is a unanimity game. Due to Example 5
if G1 does not have vetoers, then U consists of all vetoers of G and uniquely recoverable.
7 Indecomposable Ideal Weighted Simple Games
The following theorem was proved in (Farra`s & Padro´, 2010, p.234) and will be of a major
importance in this chapter.
Theorem 7 (Farra`s-Padro´, 2010). Any indecomposable ideal weighted simple game belongs to
one of the seven following types:
H: Simple majority or k-out-of-n games.
B1: Hierarchical conjunctive games H∀(n, k) with n = (n1, n2), k = (k1, k2), where k1 < n1
and k2 − k1 = n2 − 1 > 0. Such games have the only shift-minimal winning coalition
{1k1 , 2k2−k1}.
B2: Hierarchical disjunctive games H∃(n, k) with n = (n1, n2), k = (k1, k2), where 1 < k1 ≤ n1,




B3: Hierarchical disjunctive games H∃(n, k) with n = (n1, n2), k = (k1, k2), where k1 ≤ n1,
k2 > n2 > 2 and k2 = k1 + 1. The shift-minimal winning coalitions have the forms {1
k1}
and {1k2−n2 , 2n2}.
T1: Tripartite games ∆1(n,k) with k1 > 1, k2 < n2, k3 = k1 + 1 and n3 = k3 − k2 + 1 > 2. It
has two types of shift-minimal winning coalitions: {1k1} and {2k2 , 3k3−k2}. It follows from
(5) that k1 ≤ n1 and k3 − k2 ≤ n3.
T2: Tripartite games ∆1(n,k) with n3 = k3 − k2 + 1 > 2 and k3 = k1 + 1. It has two types of
shift-minimal winning coalitions: {1k1} and {1k2−n2 , 2n2 , 3k3−k2}. It follows from (5) that
k1 ≤ n1, k2 − n2 ≤ k1, and k3 − k2 ≤ n3.
T3: Tripartite games ∆2(n,k) with k3−k1 = n2+n3−1 and k3 = k2+1 and k2−n2 > k1, n3 > 1.
It has two types of shift-minimal winning coalitions {1k2−n2 , 2n2} and {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}
(the case when k3− k1 = n3 and n2 = 1 is not excluded). It follows from (6) that k1 ≤ n1,
k2 − n2 ≤ n1, and k3 − k1 − n3 < n2.
Farras and Padro (2012) wrote these families more compactly but equivalently. However, we
found it more convenient to use their earlier classification. The list above contains some decom-
posable games as we will now show.
Proposition 6. The game of type B1 for k2 − k1 = n2 − 1 = 1 is decomposable.
Proof. The decomposition is as follows: Assume k2−k1 = n2−1 = 1, so n2 = 2 and k2 = k1+1,
then we have k = (k1, k1 + 1),n = (n1, 2), and the only shift-minimal winning coalition here is
{1k1 , 2}. Let the first game G = (PG,WG), be one-partite with PG = {1
n1+1}, WG = {1
k1+1},
and let the second game be H = (PH ,WH), PH = {2
2},WH = {2}. Then the composition
G◦1H over a player 1 ∈ PG gives two minimal winning coalitions {1
k1+1} and {1k1 , 2}, of which
only {1k1 , 2} is shift-minimal. Hence the composition is of type B1. This proves that a game of
type B1 is decomposable in this case.
Proposition 7. The unanimity games Un and anti-unanimity An for n > 2 are decomposable.
U2 and A2 are indecomposable.
Proof. We note that
Un ◦ Um ∼= Un+m−1
for any u ∈ Un. In particular, the only indecomposable unanimity game is U2. Similarly,
An ◦Am ∼= An+m−1
for any a ∈ An with the only indecomposable anti-unanimity game is A2.
Proposition 8. All games of type T2 are decomposable.
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Proof. Let ∆ = ∆1(n,k) be of type T2. Then we have the following decomposition for it.
The first game will be G = (PG,WG), which is bipartite with the multiset representation on
{1n1 , 2n2+1} and shift-minimal winning coalitions of types {1k1} and {1k2−n2 , 2n2+1}. The second
game will be (k3 − k2)-out-of-n3 game H = (PH ,WH), with the multiset representation on
P¯H = {3
n3} and shift-minimal winning coalitions of type {3k3−k2}. The composition is over a
player p ∈ PG from level 2. Then we can see that G ◦p H has shift-minimal winning coalitions
of types {1k1} and {1k2−n2 , 2n2 , 3k3−k2}, hence is exactly ∆.
We now refine classes H and B1 as follows:
H: Games of this type are A2, U2 and Hn,k, where 1 < k < n.
B1: Hierarchical conjunctive games H∀(n, k) with n = (n1, n2), k = (k1, k2), where k1 < n1 and
k2 − k1 = n2 − 1 > 1.
The following of Theorem 7, is now an if-and-only-if statement.
Theorem 8. A game is ideal weighted and indecomposable if and only if it belongs to one of
the following types: H,B1,B2,B3,T1,T3.
Proof. Due to Theorem 7 and Propositions 6-8 all that remains to show is that the remaining
cases are indecomposable. We leave this routine work to the reader.
Let us compare this theorem with Theorem 7. We narrowed the class H, we excluded the
case n2 = 2 in B1 and removed class T2.
8 Compositions of ideal weighted indecomposable games
Suppose from now on that we have a composition G = G1 ◦gG2, where both G1 and G2 are ideal
and weighted, and G1 is indecomposable. The plan now is to fix G1 and analyse what happens
when we compose it with an arbitrary ideal weighted game G2. Since G1 is ideal weighted and
indecomposable, then it belongs to one of the seven types of games listed in Theorem 8. So we
carry out the analysis case by case for all possibilities of G1.
The key result that will lead us to the main theorem of this paper is the following.
Theorem 9. Let G be a game with no dummies which has a nontrivial decomposition G =
G1 ◦g G2, such that G1 and G2 are both ideal and weighted, and G1 is indecomposable. Then G
is ideal weighted if and only if either
(i) G1 is of type H, or
(ii) G1 is of type B2 and G2 is An such that the composition is over a player g of level 2 of G1.
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We will prove it in several steps. Firstly, we will consider all cases when g is from the least
desirable level of G1. Secondly, in Appendix, we will deal with the hypothetical cases when
g is not from the least desirable level. This is because, unfortunately, Lemma 2 still leaves a
possibility that for some special cases of G2 this decomposition may be over g which is not the
least desirable in G1.
8.1 The two weighted cases
Proposition 9. If G1 = (P1,W1) is of type H and G2 = (P2,W2) is weighted, then G = G1◦gG2
is weighted.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then G has a certificate of nonweightedness
(X1, . . . ,Xm;Y1, . . . , Ym),
where X1, . . . ,Xm are minimal winning coalitions and Y1, . . . , Ym are losing coalitions of G. Let
Ui = Xi ∩ P1, then either |Ui| = k or |Ui| = k − 1. However, if for a single i we have |Ui| = k,
then it cannot be that all of the sets Y1, . . . , Ym are losing, as there will be at least one among
with at least k elements of P1. Thus |Ui| = k − 1 for all i. In this case we have Xi = Ui ∪ Si,
where Si is winning in G2. Let Yi = Vi ∪ Ti, where Vi ⊆ P1 and Ti ⊆ P2. We must have
|Vi| = k − 1 for all i. Since all coalitions Y1, . . . , Ym are losing in G, then all Ti are losing in
G2. But now we have obtained a trading transform (S1, . . . , Sm;T1, . . . , Tm) for G2, such that
all Si are winning and all Ti are losing in G2, i.e., a certificate of nonweightedness for G2. This
contradicts the fact that G2 is weighted.
Proposition 10. Let G1 = (P1,W1) be a weighted simple game of type B2, g is a player from
level 2 of P1, and G2 is An, then G = G1 ◦g G2 is a weighted simple game.
Proof. Since g is a player from level 2 of P1, then G is a complete game by Theorem 4. Also,
recall that shift-minimal winning coalitions of a game of type B2 are {1
k1} and {2k1+1}. We
shall prove weightedness of G by showing that it cannot have a certificate of nonweightedness. In
the composition, in the multiset notation, G has the following shift-minimal winning coalitions
{1k1}, {2k1 , 3}. So all shift-minimal winning coalitions have k1 players from P1 \{g}. Also, since
G1 has two thresholds k1 and k2 such that k2 = k1+1, then any coalition containing more than
k1 players from P1 \ {g} is winning in G1, and hence winning in G. Suppose now towards a
contradiction that G has the following certificate of nonweightedness
(X1, . . . ,Xn;Y1, . . . , Yn), (7)
where X1, . . . ,Xn are shift-minimal winning coalitions and Y1, . . . , Yn are losing coalitions in G.
Let the set of players of An be PAn . It is easy to see that at least one of the coalitions X1, . . . ,Xn
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in (7) is not of the type {1k1}, so at least one of these winning coalitions has a player from the
third level, i.e. from An. But since each shift-minimal winning coalition in (7) has k1 players
from P1 \ {g}, then each losing coalition Y1, . . . , Yn in (7) also has k1 players from P1 \ {g} (if it
has more than k1 then it is winning). Moreover, at least one coalition from Y1, . . . , Yn, say Y1,
has at least one player from PAn . It follows that (Y1 ∩ P1) ∪ {g} ∈W1 and Y1 ∩ PAn is winning
in An. Hence Y1 is winning in G, contradiction. Therefore no such certificate can exist.
In the next section we analyse the remaining of compositions G = G1 ◦ G2 in terms of G1,
where the composition is over a player from the least desirable level of G1. We will show that
none of them is weighted.
8.2 All other compositions are nonweighted
Here we will consider two cases:
1. G2 has at least one minimal winning coalition with cardinality at least 2.
2. G2 = An, where n ≥ 2.
We will start with the following general statement which will help us to resolve the first case.
Definition 7. Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and g ∈ P . We say that a coalition X is
g-winning if g /∈ X and X ∪ {g} ∈W .
Every winning coalition is of course g-winning but not the other way around.
Lemma 3. Let G be a game for which there exist coalitions X1,X2, Y1, Y2 such that both X1
and X2 do not contain g,
(X1,X2 ; Y1, Y2) (8)
is a trading transform, X1 is winning X2 is g-winning and Y1 and Y2 are losing in G. Let also H
be a game with a minimal winning coalition U which has at least two elements, then C = G◦gH
is not weighted.
Proof. If X2 is winning in G, then there is nothing to prove since (8) is a certificate of non-
weightedness for C, suppose not. Let U = U1 ∪ U2, where U1 and U2 are losing in H. Then it
is easy to check that
(X1,X2 ∪ U ; Y1 ∪ U1, Y2 ∪ U2)
is a certificate of nonweightedness for C. Indeed, X1 and X2 ∪ U are both winning in C and
Y1 ∪ U1 and Y2 ∪ U2 are both losing.
The only exception in this case is when H consists of passers and dummies. We will have to
consider this case separately.
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Lemma 4. If G is of type B1, B2 or B3, g is any element of level 2, and H has a minimal
winning coalition X which has at least two elements, then G ◦g H is not weighted.
Proof. Suppose G is of type B1. Then let us consider the following trading transform
({1k1 , 2k2−k1}, {1k1 , 2k2−k1−1} ; {1k1−1, 2k2−k1+1}, {1k1+1, 2k2−k1−2})
(note that k2 − k1 + 1 = n2 and k1 + 1 ≤ n1 so there is enough capacity in both equivalence
classes to make all coalitions involved legitimate). It is easy to check that the first coalition in
this sequence is winning, the second is g-winning and the remaining two are losing. By Lemma 3
the result holds.
Suppose now G is of type B2, then k2 = k1 + 1 ≤ n2. Let k1 = k. Then we can apply
Lemma 3 to the trading transform













where {1k} is winning, {2k} is g-winning and the remaining two coalitions are losing.
If G is of type B3, then n2 < k2 = k1 + 1. We again let k = k1. In this case we can apply
Lemma 3 to the trading transform
({1k}, {1k−2, 22} ; {1k−1, 2}, {1k−1, 2}),
where the first coalition is winning, the second is g-winning (we use n2 ≥ 3 here) and the two
remaining coalitions are losing.
Lemma 5. If G is of type T1 or T3, g is any element of level 3, and H has a minimal winning
coalition X which has at least two elements, then C = G ◦g H is not weighted.
Proof. If G is of type T1. Then let us consider the following trading transform
({1k1}, {2k2 , 3k3−k2−1} ; {1k1−1, 2}, {1, 2k2−1, 3k3−k2−1}).
Lemma 3 is applicable to it so C is not weighted.
Suppose G is of type T3. Then let us consider the following trading transform
({1k2−n2 , 2n2}, {1k1 , 2n2−1, 3n3−1} ; {1k2−n2 , 2n2−1, 3}, {1k1 , 2n2 , 3n3−2}).
Since n3 > 1 all coalitions exist. Lemma 3 is now applicable and shows that C is not weighted.
This proves the lemma.
We will now deal with the second case. Denote players of An by PAn .
Proposition 11. Let G1 be an ideal weighted indecomposable simple game of types B1, B3, T1,
and T3, and g be a player from the least desirable level of G1, then G = G1◦gAn is not weighted.
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Proof. Let G1 be of type B1. The only shift-minimal winning coalition of G1 is of the form
{1k1 , 2k2−k1}, where n1 > k1 > 0, k2 − k1 = n2 − 1 > 1. Composing over a player of level 2 of
G1 gives shift-minimal winning coalitions of types {1
k1 , 2k2−k1} and {1k1 , 2k2−k1−1, 3}. Thus the
game is not weighted due to the following certificate of nonweightedness:
({1k1 , 2k2−k1}, {1k1 , 2k2−k1−1, 3}; {1k1−1, 2k2−k1+1, 3}, {1k1+1, 2k2−k1−2}).
Since in a game of type B1 we have k2 − k1 + 1 = n2 and k1 + 1 ≤ n1, then all the coalitions in
this trading transform exist.
Now consider B3. Its shift-minimal winning coalition have types {1
k1}, {1k2−n2 , 2n2}. Com-
posing over a player of level 2 of G1 gives the following types of winning coalitions {1
k1},
{1k2−n2 , 2n2−1, 3} in G. The game is not weighted due to the following certificate of nonweight-
edness:
({1k2−n2 , 2n2−1, 3}, {1k2−n2 , 2n2−1, 3}; {1k2−n2+1, 2n2−2}, {1k2−n2−1, 2n2 , 32}).
Note that k2 − n1 + 1 < k1 ≤ n1 and n2 > 2 in B3, so all the coalitions in this transform exist.
Now consider T1. Since its levels 2 and 3 form a subgame of type B1, composing it with An
over a player of level 3, as was proved, will result in a nonweighted game.
Let us considerT3, where the shift-minimal winning coalition are {1
k2−n2 , 2n2}, {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}.
If we compose over a player of level 3 of G1, then the resulting game will have shift-minimal
coalitions of the following type {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−1, 4}, where now elements of G2 = An will
form level 4. Then we can show that the composition G1◦G2 is not weighted due to the following
certificate of nonweightedness:
({1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−1, 4}, {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−1, 4};
{1k1+1, 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−2}, {1k1−1, 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3 , 42}).
The coalition {1k1+1, 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−2} is losing because in T3 we have k3−k1−n3 = n2−1 and
also k2−n2 > k1, meaning (k1+1)+(k3−k1−n3) = k1+1+n2−1 ≤ k2−n2+n2−1 = k2−1
Also in total it contains less than k3 elements. The coalition {1
k1−1, 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3 , 42} is easily
seen to be losing as well.
Now all that remains for the proof of Theorem 9 is to consider the cases when g is not
from the least desirable level of G1 which may happen only when it is of types T1 and T3.
These cases are similar to those that have been already considered and we delegate them to the
Appendix.
9 The Main Theorem
All previous results combined give us the main theorem:
18
Theorem 10. G is an ideal weighted simple game if and only if it is a composition
G = H1 ◦ . . . ◦Hs ◦ I ◦g An (s ≥ 0); (9)
where Hi is an indecomposable game of type H for each i = 1, . . . , s. Also, I, which is allowed
to be absent, is an indecomposable game of types B1, B2, B3, T1 and T3, and An is the anti-
unanimity game on n players. Moreover, An can be present only if I is either absent or it is of
type B2; in the latter case the composition I ◦ An is over a player g of the least desirable level
of I. Also, the above decomposition is unique.
Proof. The following proposition will be useful to show the uniqueness of the decomposition of
an ideal weighted game.
Proposition 12. Let H be a game of type H, B be a game of type B2 with b being a player from
level 2 of B, G be an ideal weighted simple game, and An be an anti-unanimity game. Then
H ◦G ≇ B ◦b An.
Proof. We note that by Theorem 4 both compositions are complete. Recall that isomorphisms
preserve Isbell’s desirability relation (Carreras & Freixas, 1996). An isomorphism preserves
completeness and maps shift-minimal winning coalitions of a complete game onto shift-minimal
winning coalitions of another game.
Let H = Hk,n. Consider first the composition H ◦G. Any minimal winning coalition in this
composition will have either k or k − 1 players from the most desirable level.
Now consider B ◦b An. Let the two types of shift-minimal winning coalitions of B are of the
forms {1ℓ} and {2ℓ+1}, then there will be a minimal winning coalition in B ◦b An which has ℓ
players from the second most desirable level and an element of level 3 with no players of level 1.
The two games therefore cannot be isomorphic.
Proof of Theorem 10. This proof is now easy since the main work has been done in Theorem 9.
Either G is decomposable or not. If it is not, then by Theorem 8 it is either of type H or one of
the indecomposable games of types B1, B2, B3, T1, and T3. So the theorem is trivially true.
Suppose now that G is decomposable, so G = G1 ◦ G2. Then by Theorem 9 there are only two
possibilities:
(i) G1 is of type H;
(ii) G1 is of type B2, and also G2 = An such that the composition is over a player of level 2
of G1.
By Proposition 12 these two cases are mutually exclusive. Suppose we have the case (i). By
Theorem 6 G1 is uniquely defined and we can apply the induction hypothesis to G2. It is also
easy to see that in the second case G1 and G2 are uniquely defined.
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11 Appendix
11.1 A canonical representation of ∆1 and ∆2.
Proposition 13. The game ∆1(n,k) is tripartite game without dummies if and only if condi-
tions (5) are satisfied.
Proof. It is easy to see from the definition that this game is complete and 1 G 2 G 3. Suppose
we actually have 1 ≻G 2 ≻G 3 so that the game is tripartite. If the condition k1 ≤ n1 is not
satisfied the condition ℓ1 ≥ k1 has no solution and 1 becomes equivalent to 2. So we assume
k1 ≤ n1. If k2 ≥ k3, then the condition ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2 is redundant which implies 2 ∼ 3 and
the game is bipartite so we assume k2 < k3. If k1 ≥ k3, then the coalition ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 ≥ k3 is
redundant and 3 is a dummy. Hence we assume k1 < k3. If we only had n2 ≤ k2 − k1, then
ℓ1+ ℓ2 ≥ k2 can be satisfied only if ℓ1 ≥ k1 is satisfied. So in this case {1
k1} is the only minimal
winning coalition, which implies 2 ∼ 3. So n2 > k2− k1. Finally, if n3 > k3 − k2 is not satisfied,
then ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 ≥ k3 implies ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2, in which case the minimal winning coalition must
satisfy either ℓ1 = k1 or ℓ1+ ℓ2+ ℓ3 = k3. We get in this case 2 ∼ 3, which is impossible. Hence
if ∆1(n,k) is tripartite and has no dummies, the conditions (5) are satisfied.
On the other hand, if (5) are satisfied, then the game has two shift-minimal winning coalitions
{1k1} and either {2k2 , 3k3−k2} in case k2 ≤ n2 or {1
k2−n2 , 2n2 , 3k3−k2} in case k2 > n2. In both
cases 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 by Proposition 1.
Proposition 14. The game ∆2(n,k) is tripartite game without dummies if and only if condi-
tions (6) are satisfied.
Proof. Suppose ∆2(n,k) is tripartite. Like in Proposition 13 we find that k1 < k3 and k2 < k3.
However, we also know that k2 − k1 ≥ n2 > 0. Hence we assume k1 < k2 < k3. If n1 + n2 ≥ k2
is not satisfied, then ℓ1 + ℓ2 ≥ k2 is ineffectual and 2 ∼ 3. So we assume n1 + n2 ≥ k2. In this
case we have a shift-minimal winning coalition C = {1k2−n2 , 2n2} and secures that 2 ≻ 3 (as
k2 < k3). If n3 > k3 − k2 is not satisfied, then ℓ1 + ℓ2 + ℓ3 ≥ k3 is redundant and 3 is a dummy.
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Since k3 > k2 we have n3 ≥ k3 − k2 +1 ≥ 2. Since ∆2(n,k) is defined for the case n2 ≤ k2− k1,
we have k1 ≤ k2 − n2 ≤ n1 and n1 ≥ k1 follows.
Now, if the coalitions {1k1} and {2k3−k1−n3+1} exist, then a replacement of 1 with 2 in a
winning coalition {1k1−1, 2k3−k1−n3+1, 3n3} results in a losing coalition {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}. As
the conditions (6) imply k1 ≤ n1, the first coalition exists. The second coalition exists since
k3 − k1 − n3 < n2 is equivalent to k3 − k1 < n2 + n3. This implies 1 ≻ 2.
Now, since n1 + n2 ≥ k2 and k2 < k3, there exists a minimal winning coalition {1
ℓ1 , 2ℓ2}
with ℓ1+ ℓ2 = k2 and ℓ2 ≥ 1. A replacement of 2 here with a 3 leads to a losing coalition, hence
2 ≻ 3.
11.2 End of proof of Theorem 9
Here we have to deal with the hypothetical possibility that G does not fall into categories (i)
and (ii). Then we know that G1 has at least two desirability levels and g is not from the least
desirable level. Also Lemma 2 implies that in this case G2 = An or G2 = Un for some n ≥ 2.
Let us deal with G2 = An first. We need the following
Lemma 6. Let G = (P,W ) be a game where player g is strictly more desirable than player g′.
Suppose also that we can find two coalitions X1 and X2 in G such that
g′ /∈ X1, X1 ∪ {g} ∈W, X1 ∪ {g
′} ∈ L; (10)
g′ ∈ X2, X2 ∪ {g} ∈W, X2 \ {g
′} ∪ {g} ∈ L. (11)
Then the composition C = G ◦g An, n ≥ 2, is not complete.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ An. We have the following certificate of incompleteness:
(X1 ∪ {a},X2 ∪ {b}; X1 ∪ {g
′},X2 \ {g
′} ∪ {a, b}).
Indeed, both X1 and X2 win with g in G and both {a} and {b} are winning coalitions in H, so
X1 ∪ {a} and X2 ∪ {b} are winning in C. On the other hand X1 ∪ {g
′} and X2 ∪ {g
′} are losing
in G and the latter even losing with g so X1 ∪ {g
′} and X2 \ {g
′} ∪ {a, b} are both losing in C.
This proves the lemma.
Lemma 7. Let G be an indecomposable simple game of one of the types B1, B2, B3, T1, and
T3, and let g be a player of G which is not from the least desirable level. Then the composition
G ◦g An is not complete for all n ≥ 2.
Proof. Let us first consider the case where g is from the most desirable level of G. We will apply
Lemma 6 to show that G ◦g An is not complete. So in what follows we show that for each case
there exists g, g′ ∈ P and coalitions X1 and X2 of G which satisfy the conditions of Lemma 6.
In the following three cases, g is a player of level 1 and g′ is a player of level 2.
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(i) B1: X1 is of type {1
k1−1, 2k2−k1}, and X2 is of type {1
k1−1, 2k2−k1};
(ii) B2: X1 is of type {1
k1−1}, and X2 is of type {2
k1};
(iii) B3: X1 is of type {1
k1−1}, and X2 is of type {1
k2−n2 , 2n2−1}.
And for the following three cases, g is a player of level 1 and g′ is a player of level 3.
(iv) T1: X1 is of type {1
k1−1}, and X2 is of type {2
k2 , 3k3−k2−1};
(v) T3: X1 is of type {1
k2−n2−1, 2n2}, and X2 is of type {1
k1−1, 3k3−k1}.
All is left is to consider composing games of the T types over a player of level 2. We start
with T1. As we know any game of type T1 contains a subgame of type B1 when we restrict
it to lavels 2 and 3 only. For that subgame 2 is the most desirable player so noncompleteness
follows from (i).
Finally we look at T3 and suppose now g is a player of level 2 and g
′ is a player of level 3.
Here X1 can be taken of type {1
k2−n2 , 2n2−1}. Indeed, if we add g to X1 it becomes winning
but it loses with g′. Then X2 can be taken of type {1
k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3−1}. We can add g to
X2 since n2 ≥ k3 − k1 − n3 + 1 and it becomes winning. We can add g and remove g
′ from it
since n3 ≥ 2. X2 will remain losing after that. So we can again apply Lemma 6 to conclude
that the composition is not complete. This completes the study of compositions where G2 is
the anti-unanimity game An, such that the compositions are not over the least desirable level of
G1.
Finally, we consider compositions where G2 is the unanimity game Un. It turns out that
none of these compositions give a weighted game either, which is what we show next.
Lemma 8. Let G1 = (P,W ) be a simple game of one of the types B1, B2, B3, T1, and T3 and
let g ∈ P be a player not from the least desirable level of G1. Then the composition G = G1 ◦gUn
is not weighted.
Proof. Let Un be defined on PUn , and let Z = PUn . We start with G1 being of type B1. A
shift-minimal winning coalition of G1 has the only form {1
k1 , 2k2−k1}, where k1 < n1. We
compose over level 1 of G1. Then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3 applied to the following trading
transform
({1k1 , 2k2−k1}, {1k1−1, 2k2−k1}; {1k1 , 2k2−k1−1}, {1k1−1, 2k2−k1+1}).
This is because the first coalition is winning, the second coalition is 1-winning and the remain-
ing two are losing. Note that k2 − k1 + 1 = n2 ≥ 2 in a game of type B1, so the coalition
{1k1−1, 2k2−k1+1} is allowed.
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Now let G1 be of typeB2. The shift-minimal winning coalitions of G1 here are {1
k1}, {2k1+1},
and if we compose with Un over level 1 of G1, then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3 applied to
the following trading transform:
({2k1+1}, {1k1−1}; {1k1−1, 2}, {2k1}).
This is because the first coalition is winning and the second is 1-winning. The remaining two
are losing.
Now let G1 be of type B3. Recall that in a game of type B3 we have k1 ≤ n1, and also
k2 − n2 < k1. So the shift-minimal winning coalitions of G1 are {1
k1}, {1k2−n2 , 2n2}. If we
compose with Un over level 1 of G1, then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3 applied to the following
trading transform:
({1k2−n2 , 2n2}, {1k1−1}; {1k2−n2 , 2n2−1}, {1k1−1, 2}).
This is because the second coalition is 1-winning.
Next we look at the games T1, and T3. Since they have three levels each, then we need to
consider what happens when composing over level 1 and when composing over level 2 separately.
Let us start with T1.
The shift-minimal winning coalitions of G1 are {1
k1} and {2k2 , 3k3−k2}. Here we need to
consider two compositions, one over level 1, and one over level 2.
Case (i). If we compose with Un over level 1 of G1 then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3 applied
to the following trading transform:
({1k1−1}, {2k2 , 3k3−k2}; {1k1−1, 2}, {2k2−1, 3k3−k2}).
This is because the first coalition is 1-winning, the second is winning and the remaining two are
losing.
Case (ii). If we compose with Un over level 2 of G1, then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3
applied to the following trading transform:
({1k1}, {2k2−1, 3k3−k2}; {1k1−1, 2}, {1, 2k2−2, 3k3−k2}).
This is because the first coalition is winning, the second coalition is 2-winning and the remaining
two are losing.
Finally, let G1 be of type T3. The shift-minimal winning coalitions of G1 are {1
k2−n2 , 2n2}
and {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}. Here we again need to consider two compositions, one over level 1,
one over level 2.
Case (i). If we compose G1 with Un over level 1 of G1, then since k1 ≤ n1, the game G is
nonweighted by Lemma 3 applied to the following trading transform:
({1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}, {1k1−1, 2k3−k1−n3 , 3n3}; {1k1 , 2k3−k1−n3−1, 3n3}, {1k1−1, 2k3−k1−n3+1, 3n3}).
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This is because the first coalition is winning, the second coalition is 1-winning and the two
remaining ones are losing. Note that k3−k1−n3+1 ≤ n2 in a game of type T3 (see Theorem 7),
so the last coalition exists.
Case (ii). If we compose with Un over level 2 of G1, then G is nonweighted by Lemma 3
applied to the following trading transform:
({1k2−n2 , 2n2−1}, {1k1 , 3k3−k1}; {1k2−n2 , 2n2−1, 3}, {1k1 , 3k3−k1−1}).
Indeed, by (6) k2 − n2 ≤ n1 and k2 < k3. Thus the first coalition exists and is 2-winning, the
second is winning and the remaining two are losing.
We see that none of the six games above produce a weighted game when composed with Un
over a player not from the least desirable level of the first game.
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